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Each year, more and more students in the United States use public funds to attend privately operated 
schools. While the vast majority of them are en.rolled in 
charter schools, the number of students participating in 
private school choice programs has increased dramati-
cally. At present, more than half of states have private 
school choice programs in place. 
Until the United States Supreme Court's landmark 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris decision in 2002, the consti-
tutionality of private school choice was in serious ques-
tion, because a number of earlier precedents invalidated 
state efforts to support faith-based schools on federal 
establishment clause grounds. In Zelman, however, 
the court rejected an establishment clause challenge 
to the Cleveland Pilot Project Scholarship Program, 
which enabled disadvantaged children to attend pri-
vate and faith-based schools, thus clearing the federal-
constitutional path to an expansion in school choice. 
Nevertheless, private school choice programs raise a 
number of other legal issues. This paper addresses sev-
eral of the most significant. 
First, it discusses whether students in the United 
States enjoy a constitutional right either to an educa-
tion or to choose their schools and the implications 
of those rights in the battle for parental choice. The 
Supreme Court has held that the federal constitution 
does not protect a right to an education although it 
does protect the right of parents to send their children 
to public school. 
Virtually every state constitution, however, enshrines 
the right to a public education-although there is tre-
mendous diversity among both the wording of these 
entitlements and state supreme courts' interpretation of 
them. These provisions have played only a limited role 
in parental-choice battles, although they are frequently 
raised in challenges to new private school choice pro-
grams. Neither the federal nor any state constitution 
guarantees public funding to enable parental choice, 
although state private school choice programs do guar-
antee funding for parental choice, at least for certain 
classes of beneficiaries. 
Second, this paper explores the range of legal obsta-
cles to the expansion of private school choice remain-
ing afi:er Zelman. In the aftermath of Zelman, many 
commentators predicted that state-constitutional estab-
lishment clauses--often called "Blaine Amendments" -
would lead to the invalidation of many programs. This 
worst-case scenario has failed to materialize, although a 
few state supreme couns have invalidated programs on 
state-constitutional grounds, including Blaine Amend-
ments and state-constitutional provisions mandating 
that states establish and maintain public school systems. 
Third, this paper examines the intersection and 
possible tension between the growth in private school 
choice programs and the goals of promoting diverse 
and inclusive schools. Since private schools are not by 
virtue of their participation in a choice program trans-
formed into government actors, they are not bound 
by either the federal constitution or federal special-
education laws. 
Efforts, however, have been made, thus far unsuc-
cessfully, to challenge parental-choice programs as run-
ning afoul of both the federal equal protection clause 
and federal laws mandating maximum inclusion of dis-
abled students. Despite the accusations leveled in these 
contexts, evidence suggests that most parental-choice 
programs actually lead minority students to enroll in 
more integrated schools. And many state programs are 
specifically designed to increase the educational options 
available to disabled students. 
Finally, this paper discusses the religious-liberty 
implications of faith-based schools participating in pri-
vate school choice programs. While Zelman made clear 
that religious schools need not secularize to participate in 
private school choice programs, many religious-school 
leaders remain concerned that the regulatory strings 
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I n 1990, 35 years after Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman first made the case for school vouchers, 
Wisconsin enacted the nation's first modern private 
school choice program. 1 The Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program provided public funds to enable 350 
children to enroll in private, secular schools. Five years 
later, Wisconsin expanded the program to include 
rel igious schools. 
Ohio soon followed suit with the Cleveland Pilot 
Project Scholarship Program. In 2002, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected an establishment clause chal-
lenge to the Cleveland program in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, thus clearing the federal-constitutional path to 
expand private school choice. 2 
The Zelman decision gave proponents of private 
school choice reason to be optimistic. Many reform-
minded state leaders had shied away from enacting 
voucher programs because oflegal uncertainty. By elim-
inating the establishment clause question, the Supreme 
Court deprived opponents of one of their most potent 
weapons- the argument that vouchers crossed the elu-
sive line separating church and state, terms which do 
not appear in the US Constitution. 
But the legal question answered in Zelman rep-
resented only one impediment to the expansion of 
private school choice. For nearly a decade after Zel-
man, the private school choice movement languished. 
Impediments included the continued legal uncertainty 
about whether private school choice could survive 
state-constitutional challenges, the disconnect between 
the political support for private school choice and its 
intended recipients, and the inelasticity of supply in the 
private school sector. 
Nicole Stelle Garnen is the John P. Murphy foundation Pro-
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But perhaps the most significant reason that the pri-
vate school choice movement languished was the dra-
matic and unexpected ascenden(.y of charter schools, 
which were aggressively promoted as a more "public" 
and politically palatable alternative for school choice. 
Charter school enrollment has grown from virtually no 
students 20 years ago to 2.3 million in the 2012-1 3 
school year, whereas private schools actually enrolled 
fewer students in 2010 than in 2000.3 
Today, private school choice is enjoying its own 
unexpected ascendency. At present, more than half 
of states and the District of Columbia have private 
school choice programs in place. These programs fall 
into four categories: (l) voucher programs, which 
provide publicly fonded scholarships to enable stu-
dents to attend private schools; (2) scholarship tax-
credit programs, which incemivize donations to 
private scholarship-granting organizations that do the 
same; (3) education savings account programs, which 
empower parents to choose how to spend some por-
tion of the public-education fonding allocated for 
their children; and (4) refundable parental tax credits 
for private school tuition. 
The largest programs in terms of enrollment are 
scholarship tax-credit programs in Florida and Ari-
zona, which benefit, respectively, 70,000 and 60,000 
students. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program has 
expanded to benefit more than 26,000 students; Ohio 
has 5 voucher programs benefiting nearly 40,000 stu-
dents; and 3 states- Indiana, Louisiana, and North 
Carolina-effectively entitle every low- and moderate-
income child in the state to a scholarship ranging from 
$4,200 in North Carolina to $8,500 in Louisiana. In 
June 2015, Nevada became the fitst state to enact a 
universal private school choice program, an education 
savings account program that makes certain public-
education funds completely portable. All rold, during 
the 201 4-15 school year, more than 350,000 students 
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anached to public funds may threaten religious lib-
erry. T his has nor been the case to date, although cer-
tainly the possibility of invasive regulations-including 
but not limited to those attached to public funds- has 
arguably increased in the wake of the Supreme Court's 
recent decision constitutionalizing a right to same-sex 
marriage. 
The religious-liberty implications of private schools 
participating in parental-choice programs and of reli-
gious schools converting to charter schools to secure 
ii 
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public funds diverge sharply, however, smce the 
accepted wisdom is that charter schools are public 
schools and must therefore be secular. While the facts 
on the ground in many states arguably undermine this 
assumption, significant legal and political impediments 
remain to religious charter schools. In light of these 
impediments, the better path forward is to advance 
the case for authentic private school choice, both by 
improving program design and funding and by increas-
ing the supply of high-performing private schools. 
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attended a private school as a beneficiary of a choice 
program.4 
Especially alongside exponential growth in char-
ter school enrollment, the expanding parental-choice 
fr)otprint is rapidly reshaping American elemen-
tary and secondary education.5 Not surprisingly, the 
expansion of parental choice also raises important 
legal questions for polic-ymakers, parents, and partici-
pating private schools. This paper reviews a few of the 
most significant. 
The first issue is whether students in the United 
States enjoy a constitutional right either to an educa-
tion or to choose their schools. The second set of ques-
tions concerns the legal landmines remaining to the 
expansion of private school choice after Zelman. In the 
aftermath of that decision, many commentators pre-
dicted that state-constitutional establishment clauses-
often called "Blaine Amendments"- would lead to 
the invalidation of many programs. The third issue is 
the intersection between the growth in private school 
choice programs and the goals of promoting diverse 
and inclusive schools. Specifically, parental-choice pro-
grams have been challenged for running afoul of the 
equal protection clause and federal laws mandating 
maximum inclusion of disabled students. 
The paper concludes by discussing the religious-
liberty implications of private school choice. After Zel-
man, it is clear that religious schools need not secular-
ize to participate in private school choice programs. 
While no existing program regulations threaten the 
religious identity and mission of faith-based schools, 
many leaders of religious schools remain concerned 
that the regulatory strings attached to public funds may 
threaten religious liberty. This has not been the case 
to date, although certainly the possibility of invasive 
regulations-including bur not limited to those 
attached to public funds-has increased in the wake of 
the Supreme Court's recent decision constitutionalizing 
a right to same-sex marriage. 
The religious-liberty implications of private schools' 
participation in parental-choice programs and of reli-
gious schools "convening" to charter schools to secure 
public funds are quite different from each other, since 
the accepted wisdom is that charter schools are public 
schools and must therefore be secular. While the facts 
on the ground in many states arguably undermine this 
2 
NICOLE STELLE GARNETI 
assumption, significant legal and political impediments 
remain for religious charter schools. In light of these 
impediments, it is best to advance the case for authen-
tic private school choice, both by improving program 
design and funding and by increasing the supply of 
high-performing private schools.<' 
The Right to an Education in the United States 
As a matter of federal-constitutional law, students have 
no right to an education in the United States. In San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the 
Supreme Court considered a federal-constitutional 
challenge to the State of 'Texas's method of financ-
ing public education, which was heavily dependent 
on local property taxes. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
system created deep disparities in funding and school 
quality that violated the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
rejecting this challenge, the Supreme Court ruled that 
education was not a fundamental right protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment and that therefore Texas's 
education-finance system was subject to substantial 
judicial deference. 
While the court expressed, as it has on numerous 
occasions both before and since, "an abiding respect for 
the vital role of education in a free society," it none-
theless stressed that the crucial task of preparing young 
people for participation in society was the purview 
of primarily state and local governments.7 Citing the 
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
the court observed, "Education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments .. . 
but the importance of a service performed by the State 
does not determine whether it must be regarded as fun-
damental for purposes of examination under the Equal 
Protection Clause. "8 
T hat said, the fact that the US Constitution does not 
enshrine a substantive right to education does not mean 
that it does not significantly constrain state and local 
education policies. The court has consistently inval-
idated, on federal equal protection grounds, policies 
that intentionally deprive students of access to public-
education opportunities on the basis of race, sex, or 
immigration status.9 Most recently, in Parents Involved 
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in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
the court ruled that the use of race in the assignment 
of elementary and secondary students as part of a "vol-
untary" effort to diversify public schools violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection dause.10 
The court has also subjected state and local educa-
tion policies to scrutiny under the First Amendment's 
free speech and religion clauses, applied the due pro-
cess clause to constrain student disciplinary policies, 
and ruled that the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to 
public-education officials. 11 Moreover, several fed-
eral statutes arguably enshrine a right to education, 
including the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act (now known as No Child Left Behind), which 
conditions states' receipt of public-education funds 
on their compliance with certain federal mandates, 
and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 
which entitles all disabled students to a "free and 
appropriate public education." l 2 
In contrast to the federal-constitutional context, the 
right to an education is universally guaranteed by all 
50 states' constitutions, either explicitly or by judicial 
interpretation . The contours of these guarantees vary 
significantly, ranging from open-ended and general 
to quite specific. Generally, state constitutions require 
the establishment of a public school system, with 
provisions using a range of adjectives to describe the 
required system (for example, "uniform," "efficient," 
"suitable," "adequate," and "thorough"). Florida's con-
stitution is perhaps the most elaborate, demanding 
that "adequate provision shall be made by law for a 
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system 
of free public schools that allows students to obtain a 
high quality education."13 
Litigation about the meaning of these dauses-
raised primarily in cases challenging interlocal dispar-
ities in public school funding-has intensified over the 
past several decades. In these cases, state courts take a 
range of interpretive approaches. Some state supreme 
courts have ruled that the issue is nonjusticiable-that 
is, that the contours of state-constitutional rights to edu-
cation are to be determined politically, not judicially.14 
Beginning with the 1971 California Supreme Court 
opinion in Serrano v. Priest; however, other courts 
aggressively tackled the question of public-education 
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finance. 15 To date, approximately one-half of all state 
supreme courts have invalidated their state's system 
of financing public schools, with most relying on 
state-constitutional education guarantees-although 
some, including Serrano, have relied on state equal pro-
tection clauses. Early cases tended to rule that state con-
stitutions demand funding equality across wealthy and 
poor school districts; later cases have ruled that state 
constitutions mandate equal educational opportu-
nity, equal access to educational opportunity, or even 
a high-quality education with judicially defined com-
ponents. 16 Most recently, several courts have ruled that 
high-poverty school districts are constitutionally enti-
tled to receive additional funds, given the needs of their 
student populations. 17 
In contrast to the federal-constitutional 
context, the right to an education is 
universally guaranteed by all 50 states' 
constitutions, either explicitly or by 
judicial interpretation. 
Although funding-equity litigation has proved 
intractable, with many courts finding themselves almost 
perpetually involved in resolving challenges to education-
funding reforms, these decisions together can be read 
as articulating a right to a public education. 18 For the 
most part, these provisions have not played a signifi-
cant role in the legal battles surrounding school choice, 
although opponents frequently argue that new choice 
programs violate state education guarantees by under-
mining educational uniformity. 
The two exceptions to this generalization are the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's decision to invalidate a statewide 
voucher program on these grounds and the recent Wash-
ington Supreme Court decision invalidating the state's 
new charter school law in a divided opinion, which 
effectively reasoned that charter schools are not public 
enough to receive public funds. l 9 That these cases are 
outliers suggests that the lack of a uniformly understood 
right to an education in the United States may provide a 
healthy space for experimentation with parental choice. 
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The Right to Parental Choice in the 
United States 
The United States Constitution protects the right of 
parental choice, at least in a relatively narrow sense. In 
the l 925 opinion Pierce v. Society oJSisters, the Supreme 
Court invalidated an Oregon law mandating that all 
parents send their children to public schools. The court 
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
clause "excludes any general power of the State to stan-
dardize its children by forcing them to accept instruc-
tion from public teachers only." The court opined, 
"The child is not the mere creature of the State; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare 
him for additional obligations."20 Together with Meyer 
v. Nebraska, a 1923 decision invalidating a state law 
that mandated the instruction of all school children be 
in English, Pierce is widely regarded as enshrining par-
ents' right to direct their children's upbringing. 21 
Subsequent decisions, however, have made clear that 
this right is not necessarily a capacious one. While in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Old Order Amish can assert a religious-liberty exemp-
tion to a compulsory-attendance law after eighth grade, 
the opinion's precedential weight has proved quite lim-
ited. Litigation asserting a constitutional right to home-
school, for example, has been met with mixed results, 
although parents now have a statutory right to home-
school their children in all 50 states. 22 Courts have also 
held that Pierce does not preclude reasonable regulation 
of home-schooling or private schools, nor does it entitle 
parents to opt out of public school curricular offerings, 
even those that are offensive to their sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs. 23 
Parents' federal-constitutional rights to educate their 
children in private schools does not include the right to 
public financing of parental choice. During the 1980s, 
a few unsuccessful lawsuits claimed that limiting the 
publicly funded educational options to public schools 
imposed an "unconstitutional condition" on the free 
exercise rights of religious parents who object to public 
school curricula. 24 Nor does any state constitution guar-
antee public funds to empower parents to select private 
schools for their children, although some litigants have 
unsuccessfully argued that parental choice ought to be 
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used to remedy the unconstitutional disparities in edu-
cational opportunities in school-finance litigation.25 
Efforts to challenge funding disparities between pub-
lic schools and charter schools on state-constitutional 
grounds have been similarly unsuccessfol. 26 
States with either voucher or education savings 
account programs do entitle certain students to use 
public funds in private schools. Characterizing these 
entitlements as a right to publicly funded parental 
choice, however, is complicated by two related factors . 
First, these programs are enshrined in state statutes, not 
constitutions, making the entitlements easier to amend 
or even eliminate. 
Second, eligibility to participate in private school 
choice programs generally is not universal: most pro-
grams are means tested, some limit participation to stu-
dents transferring from public school (in some cases, 
from failing public schools), and a substantial minority 
limit eligibility to special-needs students. In June 2015, 
Nevada became the first state to make publicly funded 
educational choice almost universally available when 
it enacted a generous education savings account pro-
gram.27 The amount of funds made available to private 
school students through all private school choice pro-
grams, however, is universally and substantially lower 
than the public fonding provided for students attend-
ing traditional public schools and charter schools. 
Remaining Constitutional Hurdles to the 
Expansion of Private School Choice 
Until the US Supreme Court's Zelman decision, 
the constitutionality of private school choice pro-
grams with religious schools was in serious question. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court 
issued a series of opinions invalidating government 
programs that provided financial and other support 
for private and faith-based schools. The court began 
to reverse course in the 1980s, upholding a number of 
government programs assisting students in faith-based 
schools. These later decisions rarely explicitly reversed 
earlier ones, however, leaving the establishment clause 
landscape a confusing jumble of conflicting precedents 
and enabling opponents to mount successful establish-
ment clause challenges in lower courts. 
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The court's 5-4 decision in Zelman cleared away 
much of this brush. In Zelman, the court upheld the 
Cleveland Pilot Project Scholarship Program, a small 
voucher program that provided disadvantaged stu-
dents in the Cleveland School District with modest 
scholarships to enroll in the school of their choice, 
including religious ones. The program did not require 
the schools receiving these fu nds to secularize or to 
guarantee that the scholarship dollars would not be 
spent on religious instruction. 
Following Zelman, many commentators 
predicted that state-constitutional limits 
on the public funding of private and 
faith-based schools remained major 
impediments to the expansion of 
private school choice. 
T he majority reasoned that the program was con-
stiturional for two related reasons. First, it was neutral 
toward religion. That is, all private schools in Cleveland 
and any public school outside of the district were eligi-
ble to participate. In fact, almost all of the participating 
schools were religious (most of them Catholic) , and 96 
percent of participating students attended a faith-based 
school. The court, however, emphasized that the ques-
tion of whether a program was religiously neutral was a 
legal, not an empirical, one. In other words, as long as 
the program was not legally limited to religious schools, 
it should be considered religion neutral. 
The second reason was that the decisions of where 
to spend the public funds available through the pro-
gram were made by the parents of eligible children, not 
the government. Therefore, the court reasoned, public 
funds flowed to the religious schools only indirectly as 
the result of private choices. Again, the court rejected 
the argument that the range of options available to par-
ents was insufficient. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 
writing for the majority, reasoned that the court should 
consider all options in the district- such as magnet and 
charter schools- rather than rhe relatively narrow band 
of schools participating in the voucher program. 
5 
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Zelman was widely regarded as closing the door 
on federal establishment clause challenges to carefully 
crafted private school choice programs. After Zelman 
was decided, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit surprised many by invalidating Arizona's 
scholarship tax-credit program . In 2011, however, 
the Supreme Court reversed this decision. In Arizona 
Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, the 
court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to chal-
lenge the program because the money at issue-private 
donations incentivized by the tax-credit program-
were not governmental funds. Winn, therefore, effec-
tively immunized scholarship tax-credit programs from 
most establishment clause challenges. 28 
Following Zelman, many commentators predicted 
that state-constitutional limits on the public fund-
ing of private and faith-based schools remained major 
impediments to the expansion of private school choice. 
In particular, commentators cited so-called Blaine 
Amendments. In 1875, US Senator James G . Blaine 
proposed an amendment to the US Constitution ban-
ning the use of public funds in "sectarian" schools- an 
effort that is widely accepted as a blatant exan1ple of 
rampant 19th century anti-Cathol icism. The proposed 
federal amendment narrowly failed in Congress, but 
subsequently, states were required to include a similar 
prohibition in their own constitutions as a condition of 
entering the Union.29 O ther states followed suit volun-
tarily, and today 37 state constitutions include at least 
one provision restricting public funding of either faith-
based schools or all private schools. 30 
Contrary to post-Zelman predictions, however, 
these provisions have not proved to be an insurmount-
able obstacle to expanding parental choice. Blaine 
Amendment challenges always follow the enactment 
of a new private school choice program, including 
most recently Nevada's sweeping education savings 
account program.3 1 W hile a number of lower state 
courts have relied on these provisions to invalidate pri-
vate school choice programs, only two state supreme 
courts have invalidated programs on Blaine Amend-
ment grounds.32 
In 2009, the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated 
programs that provided publicly funded scholarships 
to enable child ren with disabilities and in foster care 
to attend private schools. The court ruled that the 
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program violated a state-constitmional provision that 
states, "No tax shall be laid or appropriation of public 
money made in aid of any church, or private or sectar-
ian school."33 The Arizona Supreme Court, however, 
rejected a Blaine Amendment challenge to the state's 
scholarship tax-credit program, suggesting that tax 
credits may be an option even in states with restrictive 
Blaine Amendments.34 
In June 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court inval-
idated a voucher program in Douglas County, Colo-
rado, on Blaine Amendment grounds. The majority 
reasoned that the state's constitution was more restric-
tive than the federal establishment clause and that it 
prohibited the government from extending financial 
benefits, even indirectly, to religious organizations 
and schools. 
As Justice Nlison Eid argued in the dissent, the court's 
sweeping ruling raises federal-constitutional questions, 
since it had the effect of discriminating against religious 
institutions. The logic of the majority opinion, as Justice 
Eid explains, arguably would prohibit Colorado from 
extending many other benefits to religious institutions, 
including tax exemptions and perhaps even police and 
fire protection. Justice Eid chided the majority for not 
taking seriously the claim that the state's Blaine Amend-
ment was motivated by unconstitutional anti-Catholic 
bias.35 The parties in the case are now asking the US 
Supreme Court to review whether Blaine Amendments 
can be used to exclude religious, but not secular, institu-
tions from government henefits.36 
Indeed, a plausible argument can be made that 
states cannot, for state-constitutional reasons or oth-
erwise, exclude religious schools from a private school 
choice program without running afoul of the neutrality 
demanded by the First Amendment's religion clause. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that both 
the free exercise and establishment clauses prohibit the 
government from either favoring or disfavoring reli-
gious individuals or institutions.37 The US Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit relied on this principle 
to invalidate the exclusion of religious colleges from a 
public scholarship program..J8 
That said, the US Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit has twice rejected the argument that the exclu-
sion of religious high schools from statewide private 
school choice programs violates the First Amendment 
6 
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and equal protecuon clauses. Both cases involved a 
long-standing "tuitioning" program in Maine, which 
provides public funds to enable children residing in 
school districts without public high schools to attend 
private, but not religious, schools. T he first , Strout v. 
Albanese, reasoned that permitting parents to use public 
funds to send their children to religious schools would 
violate the establishment clause, a result foreclosed 
three years later in Z elman .. ~9 
The choices of parents should not raise 
legal issue about racial segregation, even 
ifparents choose these schools because 
of their racial demographics. 
The second, Eulitt v. Maine Department of Educa-
tion, was decided after Z elman but relied heavily on 
the Supreme Court's decision in Locke v. Davey, which 
upheld a Washington program that provided college 
scholarships but prohibited the recipient from pursing 
a devotional theology degree.40 In Locke, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that compliance with Washingron's 
Blaine Amendment trumped the minimal burden 
on the plaintiff's free exercise rights . Since the major-
ity opinion emphasized the unique antiestablishment 
interests at stake when state funds are used to support 
members of the clergy, Locke does not preclude-bur 
does complicate-challenges to excluding religious 
schools from private school choice programs.4 1 It is 
worth noting, however, that except for Maine and Ver-
mont's "ruitioning" regimes, no private school choice 
program excludes religious schools. 
A5ide from Blaine Amendments, private school 
choice programs have been challenged as running afoul 
of the state-constitutional provisions at issue in equity 
and adequacy litigation. In Bush v. Holmes, the Horida 
Supreme Court held that a statewide "failing schools" 
voucher program violated a state-constitutional provi-
sion demanding a "uniform" system of public schools. 
Other state supreme courts, however, have rejected sim-
ilar uniformity challenges to parental choice, reasoning 
that parental choice supplements rather than supplants 
public schools.42 
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In July 2015, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
became the most recent state supreme court to reject 
a uniformity challenge to voucher legislation.43 A uni-
formity challenge to the largest private school choice 
program in the county- Florida's scholarship tax-credit 
program, which was enacted after the Bush v. Holmes 
decision and today benefits 70,000 students-is pend-
ing. 44 In May 2015, the trial judge in that case dis-
missed the challenge on standing grounds.45 
Integration, Inclusion, and Private School Choice 
Opponents of charter schools and private school choice 
routinely assert that these programs lead children to 
learn in less integrated classrooms and enable the exclu-
sion of students with special needs. They frequently 
mention "white academies," which emerged in south-
ern states after Brown v. Board ofEducation and enabled 
white parents to use public funds to avoid sending their 
children to integrated public schools.46 These accusa-
tions are obviously sobering, and parental-choice pro-
ponents should take them seriously when designing 
and implementing choice programs. 
But the accusations also are excessively and inten-
tionally alarmist. The politics and demographics of 
parental choice today are a far cry from the political 
and legal landscape leading to the creation of white 
academies post-Brown. After all, most parental-choice 
programs, by design, benefit disadvantaged students, 
and disadvantaged minority students disproportion-
ately take advantage of parental choice when it becomes 
available. Some minority parents choose to send their 
children to schools wi th predominantly or even entirely 
minority student bodies. 
In the charter context, in particular, scholars are 
locked in a fixed battle over the meaning of enrollment 
data-with some scholars claiming that charter schools 
are more racially isolated than public schools and others 
arguing that they are not.47 In the private school choice 
context, the available evidence suggests that parental 
choice generally increases the likelihood that a student 
will attend a more integrated schooi.48 
The fact that minority parents both take advan-
tage of parental choice disproportionately and some-
times choose to enroll their kids in majority-minority 
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schools is not in itself a cause for alarm. Minority par-
ents' participation rates and enrollment decisions more 
likely reflect an understandable and admirable desire 
to improve their children's educational prospects than 
a desire to self-segregate. Moreover, the choices ofpar-
ents should not raise legal issue about racial segregation, 
even if parents choose these schools because of their 
racial demographics. The Co1i.stitution applies to only 
government actors, not private ones. It therefore does 
not constrain the decisions of parents participating in 
parental-choice programs. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has made abun-
dantly clear that the mere receipt of public funds 
does not transform a private actor into a public one. 
For example, in Rendell-Baker v. Kuhn, the Supreme 
Court held that a heavily regulated private school for 
special-needs high school students that received more 
than 90 percent of its funds from the state was not a 
state actor. "The school," the court observed, "is not 
fundamentally different from many private corpora-
tions whose business depends on [government] con-
tracts. Acts of such private contractors do not become 
acts of the government by reason of their significant 
or even total engagement in performing public con-
tracts."49 The actions of private schools participating 
in parental-choice programs are even more attenu-
ated from the state than from government contractors 
because their receipt of public funds depends on pri-
vate choices, not public ones. Therefore, the federal 
constitution does not govern these schools' relation-
ships with their employees and students.SO 
Despite all this, in the summer of 2013, the US 
Department of Justice filed a federal court action 
alleging that Louisiana's statewide voucher threatened 
to undermine desegregation efforts in 34 Louisiana 
school districts that remain under federal court super-
vision for past racial segregation. The Department of 
Justice further alleged that the program violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause to 
the extent that it upset the racial balance of public 
schools in these districts. 5 I Somewhat ironically, the 
majority of students receiving scholarships were Afri-
can American, so the Department of Justice essentially 
was claiming that the departure of black students from 
public to private schools was resulting in unconstitu-
tional segregation. 52 
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Ultimately, the Depanment of Justice dropped its 
demand that federal courts supervising desegregation 
consent decrees ensure that no transfer enabled by the 
program would upset the racial balance of local public 
schools- instead substituting a request for comprehen-
sive programmatic data.53 The Department of Justice's 
action, however, suggests that the Obama administration 
believes the equal protection clause limits the expansion 
of parental choice in school districts subject to judicially 
supervised desegregation decrees.54 The (questionable) 
logic of the administration's judicial action is that these 
orders are remedial- they correct districts' past acts of 
intentional segregation and ensure ongoing compliance 
with the equal protection clause. Therefore, the argu-
ment goes, the federal judges supervising desegregation 
in these districts have a duty to ensure compliance with 
numerical racial enrollment targets. 
Moreover, just as support for parental 
choice is highest among minority parents, 
many parents of special-needs students 
frequently seek alternatives to public 
schools when parental choice is an option. 
Outside of the limited- and diminishing-
context of judicially ordered desegregation decrees, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's equal protection clause prohibits only 
intentional government discrimination, not programs 
that have disproportionate racial effects.55 There-
fore policies with a disproportionate impact on racial 
minorities are not unconstitutional unless that effect 
was a policy's intended result. Moreover, after Parents 
Involved in Communfry Schools v. Seattle Schoof District 
No. I, the equal protection clause would presumptively 
prohibit any effort to racially balance the students par-
ticipating in parental-choice programs.56 
That is not to say that the demographics of paren-
tal choice have no legal implications. The governmen-
tal entities enacting and administering parental-choice 
programs, as well as private schools receiving federal 
funds, are obligated to comply with Title VI of the Civil 
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Rights Act of 1968, which prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, and national origin. Many pri-
vate schools serving low-income children receive federal 
funds through child nutrition programs, supplemental 
instructional and professional-development programs 
established under the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act, or both. 
While the Supreme Court has held that Tide VI, 
like the equal protection clause, prohibits only inten-
tional discrimination, regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to Title VI also prohibit policies with a disparate 
impact on minority students protected by the statute. 
These regulations could conceivably be used to police 
racial disparities in enrollment in private school choice 
programs or even in individual schools. The regula-
tions, however, can be enforced by only the federal gov-
ernment because the Supreme Court has ruled that no 
"private right of action" is available to aggrieved indi-
viduals.57 Some state supreme courts have ruled that 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under state 
equal protection clauses, although no parental-choice 
program has been invalidated on these grounds. 
Opponents of parental choice also assert that private 
schools and charter schools routinely exclude students 
with disabilities. It is true that private schools are not 
required to provide the full array of special-education 
services mandated by the Individuals with Disabil ities 
Education Act (IDEA), which entitles disabled stu-
dents to a "free and appropriate public education." In 
contrast, charter schools must accommodate the needs 
of all disabled students unless state education agencies 
make alternative arrangements for serving them.58 
Any private school that receives federal funds is 
bound by Title VI and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968, which prohibit, respectively, race and sex discrim-
ination by recipients of federal funds, as well as Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits 
recipients of federal funds from discriminating against 
individuals with disabilities.59 Section 504 has the effect 
of requiring private schools to enroll disabled students if 
the student is qualified to participate in the school's pro-
gram "with minor adjustments," but it does not require 
the school to substantially modify facilities or program-
ing to accommodate disabled children.60 
Additionally, Tide III of the Americans with Disabil-
ity Act (ADA) requires places of public accommodation, 
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including private schools, to eliminate unnecessary eligi-
bility standards and make reasonable accommodations 
for disabled students and employees (including provid-
ing auxiliary aids) unless these changes would result in 
a "fundamental alteration" in the school's program.61 
Ifowever, religious organizations, including faith-based 
schools, are exempt from these ADA provisions.62 
It is important to contextualize the claims that 
parental choice undermines the goal of full inclu-
sion for disabled students. It is true that many private 
schools are not equipped to serve students with serious 
disabilities, but many public schools are not either. In 
fact, many districts pay specialized private schools to 
serve these students, as was the case in Rendell-Baker. 
Moreover, just as support for parental choice is highest 
among minority parents, many parents of special-needs 
students frequently seek alternatives to public schools 
when parental choice is an option. 
The demand for these alternatives is reflected in the 
sizable proportion of private school choice programs 
that serve special-needs students: more than a dozen 
special-needs voucher or tax-credit programs have been 
enacted. One of them-Florida's John M. McKay 
Scholarship for Students with Disabilities Program-is 
one of the largest private school choice programs in the 
United States, with nearly 30,000 participants. Schools 
participating in special-needs voucher and tax-credit 
programs are required to serve the needs of participat-
ing disabled students, which is enforced through a vari-
ety of procedural and reporting regulations.63 
IDEA also gives parents who are dissatisfied with 
public school instruction and services the right to with-
draw their children, enroll them in private schools, and 
demand that the district pay the tuition. It is telling 
that this is a frequently litigated question, especially 
since the strategy is a risky one, as the district is not 
required to pay tuition unless a federal court finds that 
their school district failed to provide a "free and appro-
priate education. "(,4 
Parental Choice and Religious Liberty 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris made clear that the federal constitution does not 
require faith-based schools to secularize as a condition 
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of participating in private school choice programs. 
More than 96 percent of the students in the program at 
issue in Zelman, the Cleveland Pilot Scholarship Pro-
gram, attended religious schools. 
As the dissenting justices' vehement objections made 
clear, religion pervaded these schools' curricula, and the 
program did not require schools to either sequester the 
funds for solely secular purposes or permit students to 
opt out of religious instruction and worship. Neverthe-
less, the majority asserted that the establishment clause 
did not prohibit parents from choosing to use publicly 
funded scholarships at these schools, because the pro-
gram was "a program of true private choice" where "the 
incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the 
perceived endorsement of a religious message, is rea-
sonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to 
the government."65 
The fact that the Constitution does not require 
faith-based schools to abandon their religious iden-
tity to participate in private school choice programs 
does not preclude government entities from imposing 
regulations that threaten to undermine the religious 
identiry of faith-based schools. Many religious leaders 
understandably fear the regulatory strings that might 
be attached to the receipt of public funds. The regula-
tory record of existing private school choice programs, 
wh ich now extends longer than 20 years, however, has 
not borne out those fears. Instead, this record suggests 
that governmental entities have consistently eschewed 
interference with the religious mission of participat-
ing school. 
In fact, arguably only one program has imposed any 
regulation on the religious identity and mission of par-
ticipating faith-based schools. The Milwaukee Parental 
Choice Program (and, since 2011, the Racine Paren-
tal Choice Program) require schools to permit partic-
ipating students to opt out of religious programs and 
instruction. 66 In more than 20 years, however, those 
fam iliar with the program indicate that only a handful 
of students have exercised this option. 
The regulations imposed on participating private 
schools focus exclusively on secular issues, such as aca-
demic quality and nondiscrimination in selecting stu-
dents. Of the 41 private school choice programs in place 
in 2014, 20 required participating schools to adminis-
ter standardized tests- either those administered by the 
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state or a nationally normed exam-and 15 required 
schools to both administer standardized tests and 
report the testing data to state regulators.67 One state, 
Indiana, prohibited persistently failing schools from 
accepting new scholarship students until their aca-
demic performance improves.GS 
Most programs require participating schools to be 
accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency 
and some minimal qualifications for teachers- usually 
a college degree but not a teacher certification . Several 
programs include minimal curriculum requirements, 
although no program requires participating schools to 
mimic the required curriculum for public schools.69 
Several states mandate independent academic evalua-
tions of program-wide results. 70 
Religious organizations are 
entitled to exemptions, either 
constitutionally or statutorily, from 
many regulations threatening their 
religious liberty and identity. 
Additionally, most parental-choice programs also 
mandate compliance with state nondiscrimination laws 
in student selection, and some programs require that 
schools select participating students by lottery when 
demand exceeds available seats. All programs, however, 
allow schools to limit the number of participating stu-
dents- some require them to do so-and to give pref-
erence to current students and their siblings.71 
Moreover, and importantly, the government's ability 
to meddle with the mission of religious organizations is 
dramatically circumscribed by law. Religious organiza-
tions are entitled to exemptions, either constitutionally 
or statutorily, from many regulations threatening their 
religious liberty and identity. 
For example, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (RFRA) precluded the government from 
requiring for-profit employers with religious objections 
from complying with the Affordable Care Act's contro-
versial "contraception mandate."72 Litigation about the 
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legality of applying the mandate to nonprofit entities, 
including religious organizations, is ongoing.73 While 
RFRA applies to only the federal government and 
therefore does not limit conditions imposed on schools 
participating in most private school choice programs, 
19 states have adopted nearly identical laws prohibiting 
governmental policies that impose a "substantial bur-
den" on the free exercise of religion.74 
Most antidiscrimination statutes exempt reli-
gious organizations from provisions prohibiting reli-
gious discrimination in the hiring and firing of certain 
employees. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC the Supreme Court unan-
imously ruled that the First Amendment's free exercise 
clause entitled religious organizations to a "ministerial 
exception" to regulations governing their selection of 
ministers, including teachers in religious schools whose 
duties included passing on the faith.75 Hosanna-Tabor 
suggests that faith-based schools can immunize them-
selves from interference with core personnel decisions 
by clarifying (in mission statements, contracts, and so 
forth) that teachers are expected to play important min-
isterial roles. 
Whether the govern ment could condition the 
receipt of parental-choice funds on a school waiving 
the ministerial exception--or on complying with reg-
ulations that infringe on religious liberty- remains 
open. This question implicates the complexities of the 
so-called unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which 
limits the government's ability to condition receiv-
ing public benefits on the surrender of constitutional 
rights. Unfortunately, the precise contours of these lim-
its are far from clear, making the question's resolution 
impossible to predict. 
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Supreme 
Court held that the University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law did not violate the First Amend-
ment's free exercise clause by refusing to officially rec-
ognize a student group that limited membership to 
professed Christians. The case suggests that govern-
mental actors do have some leeway-although how 
much is not clear- to condition the receipt of public 
benefits on waiving free exercise rights.76 
Finally, while concerns about potential regula-
tory strings attached to parental-choice funds are not 
unfounded, it is important to note that such regulations 
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could also be imposed directly on faith-based schools, 
even those that do not participate in private school 
choice programs. In fact, many of the existing regula-
tions that threaten the religious liberty of faith-based 
institutions, including religious schools, have been 
imposed across the board-not as a condition of receiv-
ing public funds. 
The Affordable Care Act's "contraception man-
date" at issue in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell is a case in 
point. The mandate required all employers to provide 
insurance coverage for contraception and abortifacient 
devices and drugs, including faith-based nonprofit 
employers with religious objections to contraception, 
regardless of whether the employers receive a penny of 
government funding.77 
As the dissents in the recent decision constitution-
alizing the right to same-sex marriage ( Obergefell v. 
Hodges) detail, rel igious organizations, includi ng faith-
based schools, have reason to be concerned about the 
effects of extending nondiscrimination laws to include 
sexual orientation and transgender status.78 For exam-
ple, several days after Obergefell, the Obama adminis-
tration announced that all federally fonded programs 
supporting marriage or parenthood must extend bene-
fits to same-sex couples on a nondiscriminatory basis.79 
Concerns about the effects of Obergefell on faith-
based organizations, however, are not limited to orga-
nizations and schools that receive public funds. For 
example, during the oral argum ent in Obergejf:ll, the 
solicitor general signaled that the tax-exempt status of 
organizations discriminating on the basis of sexual ori-
entation was in question. so Since the decision, activists 
have openly called for the elimination of the tax bene-
fits enjoyed by religious institutions.81 
The Unique Case of Charter School 
Conversions 
It is very important to distinguish between the religious-
liberty implications of fa.ith-based schools participat-
ing in a private school choice program and those of a 
faith-based school's conversion into a charter school to 
secure public funds . W hile faith-based schools partic-
ipating in private school choice programs can main-
tain their autonomy and religious identity, they must 
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sacrifice both to secure the funding provided by charter 
school laws. There are two reasons why it is commonly 
assumed that religious schools cannot become charter 
schools and remain religious. The firs t is the universal 
view that the First Amendment's establishment clause 
prohibits religious charter schools, which I will chal-
lenge. 82 The second is that state laws prohibit religious 
charter schools. 
While faith-based schools participating 
in private school choice programs can 
maintain their autonomy and religious 
identity, they must sacrifice both to 
secure the funding provided by 
charter school laws. 
State laws express this prohibition in various ways. 
The majority approach is to simply require charter 
schools to be nonsectarian. Seven states-and the fed-
eral government-additionally prohibit charter schools 
from being affiliated with religious institutions, and 
two others (Maine and New Hampshire) prohibit 
such affil iation to the extent that it is prohibited by the 
US Constitution. Others- for example, New York-
prohibit charter schools from being under the control 
of a religious institution. Finally, a handful of states-
for example, Georgia and Indiana-explicitly permit 
religious institutions to operate charter schools, so long 
as the charter schools are secular. 83 
In other words, in most states, because religious 
institutions may not operate charter schools, not only 
must the converted school secularize but also the reli-
gious organization previously operating the school 
must relinquish control. For example, basketball leg-
end David Robinson founded a faith-based school, the 
Carver Academy, in San Antonio in 2001. A few years 
ago, however, Robinson opted to enlist a charter oper-
ator to assume control of the school and run it as a sec-
ular charter academy. 84 
As a practical matter, private, secular schools serv-
ing low- or moderate-income students have every 
incentive to become charter schools to secure public 
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funds. Even in states with private school choice pro-
grams, the per-pupil funding for charter schools is 
generally much higher than the scholarship amount 
provided to private schools. In some states, charter 
schools (but not private schools) also receive capital 
funding, and charter schools (but not private schools) 
are eligible for a variety of federal grants.85 Private 
philanthropic efforts, including the New Schools 
Venture Fund and the Charter School Growth Fund, 
focus intensely on charter schools to the exclusion of 
private schools. 86 
Although 12 states explicitly prohibit the conversion 
of private schools into charter schools, these prohibi-
tions are in reality easily circumvented, because when 
a private school becomes a charter school, it generally 
closes and reopens as a new school. 87 Urban leaders 
usually welcome such conversions because they intro-
duce established schools with strong educational track 
records. For example, when the Diocese of Brooklyn 
recently sought to convert some of its parochial schools 
to charters, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
not only welcomed the announcement but also actively 
helped the diocese structure the conversions in a way 
that avoided New York's express prohibition of private 
school conversions. 88 
Charter school conversions are the subject of an 
intense debate among Catholic leaders and educa-
tors. A handful of archdioceses or dioceses, includ-
ing Brooklyn, Indianapolis, Miami, and Washington, 
DC, have converted some of their schools to charter 
schools rather than close them. In many cities, charter 
schools operate in closed Catholic schools by default, 
since the buildings are available and ideal for school 
purposes. 
Some Catholic school leaders, including many bish-
ops, view the loss of religious identity and autonomy as 
too high a price to pay for public funding. O thers, fac-
ing escalating costs and dwindling enrollments, reluc-
tantly view charter school conversions as preferable 
to school closures, because they offer the resources to 
enable schools to continue serving inner-city children, 
even if not as Catholic schools. As a senior leader in the 
Archdiocese of Indianapolis explained when the arch-
diocese opted to convert two urban Catholic schools 
to charter schools, "Many urban Catholic schools 
are closing across the nation, and we did not want to 
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leave the students or communities we currently serve. 
Through this transformation, an urgent and unmet 
need will be filled ."89 
In dioceses where charter conversions have occurred, 
proponents suggest possibilities to maintain continuity 
with the mission of the former parochial schools. For 
example, some argue for "wrap around" charter schools 
that offer religious education classes before or after 
school. 90 As a practical matter, except for the Archdi-
ocese of Indianapolis, none of the dioceses converting 
their schools appears to have actually implemented a 
wrap-around model in the new charter schools. 
Additionally, again with the exception oflndianapo-
lis, all the dioceses relinquished operational control to a 
secular charter provider-although in DC, the archdio-
cese formed and populated the board of the operator, at 
least initially. 91 The Archdiocese of Indianapolis opted 
to run the charter schools as secular schools itself- an 
option permitted under Indiana law-and offered reli-
gious instruction in the adjacent parishes after school 
hours.92 Tellingly, following the enactment oflndiana's 
statewide private school choice program, the archdio-
cese decided to reconvert one charter school back to a 
Catholic school and relinquish all control and affilia-
tion with the second.93 
Given the charter school market's evolution, the 
First Amendment's establishment clause- contrary to 
conventional wisdom- arguably should not prohibit 
religious charter schools. The view that charter schools 
must be secular fl.ows from two related assumptions 
about the nature of charter schools and charter school 
funding. The first is that charter schools arc public 
schools, and there is no serious debate today about the 
rule that public school curriculum must be secular.94 
Although some federal courts have held that- at least 
for some constitutional purposes- charter schools are 
not governmental actors, the view that charter schools 
are public schools is well entrenched.95 
State laws universally characterize charter schools 
as public schools.96 This characterization flows from 
the fact that, at least theoretically, charter school laws 
do more than permit charter schools to operate- they 
authorize the creation of new public schools. In theory, 
charter schools do not exist before they are granted a 
charter by- in most states-a government entity, most 
frequently state boards of education and local school 
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boards and, in some states, special public commissions 
and public universities.97 
However, the charter market has arguably evolved 
away from early expectations about how the chartering 
process would work. More and more charter schools 
are franchises or branches of a charter management 
organ ization (CMO) seeking permission to expand to a 
new marker or within an existing one. T he CMO, not 
the state, creates the school, which is privately operated 
and largely independently from the public educational 
authorities. 
Moreover, the creation of a new school through a 
chartering process does not necessarily make it pub-
lic for establishment clause purposes. After all, private 
schools generally cannot operate without government 
approval. Most private schools-including those par-
ticipating in private school choice programs-are pri-
vate corporations and are, like charter schools, created 
by a state's decision to grant a corporate charter. In fact, 
with the expansion of CMO-managed schools, private 
schools participating in parental-choice programs may 
be more likely to be created by state law-through the 
incorporation process- than charter schools are. 
T he second reason for assuming that the Consti-
tution requires charter schools to be secular is related 
to the direct-indirect aid distinction in the Supreme 
Court's establishment clause jurisprudence. As the 
court observed in Zelman, "Our decisions have drawn 
a consistent distinction between government programs 
that provide aid directly to religious schools and pro-
grams of true private choice, in which government aid 
reaches religious schools only as a result of the gen-
uine and independent choices of private individu-
als."98 In the indirect-aid context, the court has held 
that the establishment clause does not prohibit reli-
gious institutions from participating in religion-neutral 
government-funding programs because the relevant 
decision maker is the private recipient of the funds-
or in the case of school-aged children, the recipients' 
parents- not the government. 
In contrast, the court has held that the government 
may nor directly fund religious activities or instruction . 
As a result, the court has limited direct government 
assistance co secular aspects of a religious organization's 
activities. This extends through a long line of cases 
addressing the constitutionality of programs providing 
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secular aid m religious instirutions-for example, 
transportation for religious school students, secular 
textboob, educational materials including comput-
ers, tutors for secular remedial instruction, and capital 
expenditures for the construction of secular buildings 
at religious colleges.99 In large part because the court 
has assumed that most religiously affiliated elementary 
and secondary schools, especially Catholic ones, are 
"pervasively sectarian" - that is, that religion pervades 
all aspects of instruction--direct financial assistance to 
sectarian elementary and secondary schools has long 
been considered a constitutional taboo. JOO 
Most private schools-including those 
participating in private school choice 
programs- are private corporations and 
are, like charter schools, created 
by a state's decision to grant a 
corporate charter. 
Therefo re, the constitutionality of religious charter 
schools depends on whether funds flow directly to the 
schools because of the government's decision to autho-
rize its operation or indirectly because of parents' deci-
sions to enroll their children. T he prevailing wisdom is 
that the government decides to fund a charter school 
when it authorizes the school's creation but that parents 
decide to fund a private school by enrolling their chil-
dren in it. In many states, this view is arguably incorrect 
because charter schools receive funding on a per-pupil 
basis as a result of a parent's enrollment decision. 
Consider New Orleans, where parents of modest 
means have two choices for their children : (I) enroll 
them in a charter school, which results in the State of 
Louisiana directing per-pupil allocation funds to the 
charter school according to a formula based on the 
amount of state and local funding that a public school 
would receive to educate that child; or (2) enroll them 
in a private school, which results in the State of Lou-
1s1ana directing a public scholarship to that school 
based on a sim ilar formula.10 1 Arguably, the per-
pupil allocation charter school funds and the 
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scholarship from the Louisiana Scholarship Program 
are a distinction without a difference. Indeed , the 
charter school funds and scholarship funds initially 
were drawn from the same state funding source, the 
Minimum Foundation Program.102 
In the end, the most prudent path 
forward is likely a proactive political 
strategy that seeks to expand the private 
school choice policy footprint and increase 
fonding levels to parity with charter 
and traditional public schools. 
In 2013, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
invalidated the scholarship program's funding mecha-
nism on state-constitutional grounds unrelated to reli-
gion, ruling that these particular funds could not go to 
private schools. 10 -~ Interestingly, the Louisiana A5soci-
ation of Educators is now challenging charter schools 
on identical grounds, arguing that charter schools 
should be treated for state-constitutional purposes as 
private schools, not public ones. 104 And the Washing-
ton Supreme Court arguably endorsed this very argu-
ment in early September 201 5 when it invalidated the 
state's new charter school law, concluding that charter 
schools could not receive public funds because they are 
not "common schools. "105 
Even if religious charter schools are constitution-
ally permissible, all states require them to be secular. 
T herefore, the possibility of religious charter schools 
would require either a statutory change- which would 
undoubtedly and swiftly prompt litigation--or a law-
suit challenging existing statutory prohibitions on free 
exercise or equal protection ground. At this point, both 
prospects seem a distant possibility. Moreover, both 
carry the risk of generating legal precedents that actu-
ally impede the expansion of parental-choice policies. 
Indeed, even secular charter schools that incorporate 
curricular themes with religious and cultural overtones 
have been subjected to significant regulatory over-
sight and constitutional challenges. 106 For example, 
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Hebrew- and Arabic-themed charter schools have been 
scrutinized to ensure they were not teaching religion. 
The now-defunct Tarek ibn Ziyad Academy (TiZA), 
an Arabic-themed school in Minnesota, was named 
for the Muslim general who conquered Spain and was 
founded and directed by an imam. The school required 
a course in Arabic language, scheduled vacations around 
Muslim holidays, permitted "voluntary and student-led 
prayer," and promised to "help students integrate into 
American society, while retaining their identity. " Fol-
lowing a settlement between the American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU) and the State of Minnesota, TiZA 
was forced to close. I 07 
The Hebrew-themed Ben Gamla Charter School 
in Hollywood, Plorida, named for a historical figure 
who established Jewish schools throughout ancienr 
Israel, was founded by a rabbi and directed by a for-
mer Jewish day school director. T he school serves only 
Kosher food and requires that one period each day be 
dedicated to teaching Hebrew and a second period 
be taught in a mix of English and Hebrew.108 Due 
to ACLU litigation th reats, the school was forced to 
"scrub" its curricula of religious references three times 
and at one point required to freeze Hebrew instruction 
for several weeks. 109 
Conclusion 
In the end, the most prudent path forward is likely a 
proactive political strategy that seeks to expand the pri-
vate school choice policy footprint and increase fund-
ing levels to parity with charter and traditional puhlic 
schools. As that footprint expands, private school choice 
is becoming a reality for more and more Americans. 
The expansion raises a number oflegal questions. 
This paper seeks to unpack a number of the most 
important legal questions raised by private school 
choice. As the discussion illustrates, the legal battle 
for parental choice in education has been primarily a 
defensive one, fought in cases challenging the legality 
of programs enacted after hard-won political battles in 
state legislatures. T his pattern differs from other efforts 
to expand the rights of the disadvantaged in the courts. 
Some offensive challenges, to be sure, have 
occurred- including a handful of lawsuits demanding 
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parental choice as a remedy in education-funding 
litigation and several seeking to invalidate state-
constitutional Blaine Amendments on federal-
constitutional grounds. These efforts have largely been 
summarily dismissed in court, however, suggesnng 
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that the best offensive strategy in the fight for paren-
tal choice likely is a good defense, focused on design-
ing good programs and defending them when they are 
inevitably challenged in court. 
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